Policing Policies: Why Do Presidential Cabinet Members Monitor Each Other?

Resumo: In this paper, we aim to explain why and when presidential cabinet parties monitor the policy implementation actions of their coalition partners. Building on the literature on the loss of information inherent to the delegation of power in multiparty systems, we argue that cabinet members perform a continuos effort to reduce the deficit of policy information and policy influence when the ideological heterogeneity of presidential cabinets increases. By using evidence from multiparty cabinets formed in Brazil and an objective measurement for policy control, we analyzed more than 20,000 requests for access to information by political parties that held ministries between 1995 and 2014. Our results support our argument, indicating that as the ideological heterogeneity of the cabinet increases, cabinet parties intensify their use of policy control on other ministries. Through the use of machine learning techniques, we were also able to reveal the policy issues and ministerial areas of higher interest for coalition and opposition parties.

Data de início: 2017-03-10
Prazo (meses): 48

Participantes:

Papel	Nome
Coordenador	Marcelo Martins Vieira